The Swedish think tank SIPRI released their annual report on worldwide military spending yesterday, and the results are to be expected. The United States still vastly outspends everybody else in the world, and China's budget is growing. While it is no longer true that the US still spends more than everybody else in the world combined, most of the other countries in the top ten are NATO allies, so it's more or less a misnomer.
If you take all of the countries that are widely accepted to be the United States' "rivals" such as China, Russia, Iran, Syria, etc., the numbers don't even come close to matching the US, and that's if you use the high end estimates for both Russia and China.
The report also concluded that worldwide military expenditures have risen about 45% in the last decade. Why is this? I found this quote in the report very troubling: "The introduction of the idea of 'the war on terrorism' has encouraged several countries to see their problems from a very militarized perspective, and is used to justify high military spending." That line is by Sam-Perlo Freeman, who authored SIPRI's study. I think that reason for more spending is largely true, but is it necessary?
Boosting defense spending isn't likely to curb terrorism, especially if we spend it on things that are not even applicable to the fight against terrorism, such as the F-22, which has never been used in a single sortie in either Afghanistan or Iraq. Streamlined intelligence and coordinated police efforts have been proven to be more effective ways to combat terrorism rather than huge military budgets. The US was spending hundreds of billions of dollars on defense, and that did not stop 9/11 from happening, and it has not stopped the emergence of China.
So what is the right amount of defense spending? Well, that would depend on what you see is the proper role of the United States in the world. If you think that the US should engage in small proxy wars on nearly every continent, then you need a high level of military spending. On the other hand, if you think that the US would be safer if it kept its nose out of other country's civil wars and internal conflicts, then a massive reduction in spending is possible. Projecting massive military power around the world is likely to result in us being less safe. If we want to stay safe, then preventive wars, offshore balancing, and power projection are not the answers. Restraint is a better path towards a long lasting peace.
Tuesday, June 9, 2009
Saturday, June 6, 2009
Iran, Israel, Nuclear Weapons, and Air Strikes
A new report was issued this week that suggests that Iran has enough centrifuges to manufacture nuclear weapons in a few month's time. But the report also noted that the inspectors had found no evidence that Iran was shifting the fuel in order to make weapons. These events don't exactly shift the equation, and they do not tell us anything we didn't already know. Iran is allowed to have nuclear power as it is a signatory of the NPT. And if they were to ever weaponize, I don't think anybody would be shocked, but more importantly, we should not overreact. Any sort of unilateral US or Israeli air strike on Natanz would be incredibly counterproductive and is exactly the kind of operation Obama and Netanyahu should avoid.
The NY Times article linked also talks about how George W. Bush refused technological support for the Israelis in the event of a unilateral air strike on Iran. If true, this is one of the few things Bush actually did right during his presidency. President Obama has to make it clear to the Israelis that the United States will not tolerate unilateral action against Iran.
What many fail to realize is that an air strike on Iran is not likely to have positive results. Iran probably wants nuclear weapons for their own security. In international politics, states are motivated by their own survival and their leaders are rational and also focused on survival. Iran's military is not able to project dominance in the Middle East region, and I don't really see any signs that they are militarizing for a strike on Israel or U.S. interests. An aggresive Israeli air strike against Iran would likely motivate not only Iran, but the wider Muslim world. Iran would find allies in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan and would probably be able to counterbalance against Israel. In addition, the presence of Hamas and other militants inside Palestinian territory would also work against Israel. Having to fight a multifront conflict would be disastrous for Israel. The combination of these factors would likely dwarf the conflicts in 1967 or 1973.
The surest way for Israel to ensure its survival is to keep a watchful eye on Iran, but not to do anything overly aggressive. Israel has every right to preserve its security, but air strikes are just likely to anger the entire region, and potentially drag the United States either directly into a conflict, or in some kind of offshore balancing (sort of like the Lend/Lease acts with the UK around WWII).
The NY Times article linked also talks about how George W. Bush refused technological support for the Israelis in the event of a unilateral air strike on Iran. If true, this is one of the few things Bush actually did right during his presidency. President Obama has to make it clear to the Israelis that the United States will not tolerate unilateral action against Iran.
What many fail to realize is that an air strike on Iran is not likely to have positive results. Iran probably wants nuclear weapons for their own security. In international politics, states are motivated by their own survival and their leaders are rational and also focused on survival. Iran's military is not able to project dominance in the Middle East region, and I don't really see any signs that they are militarizing for a strike on Israel or U.S. interests. An aggresive Israeli air strike against Iran would likely motivate not only Iran, but the wider Muslim world. Iran would find allies in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan and would probably be able to counterbalance against Israel. In addition, the presence of Hamas and other militants inside Palestinian territory would also work against Israel. Having to fight a multifront conflict would be disastrous for Israel. The combination of these factors would likely dwarf the conflicts in 1967 or 1973.
The surest way for Israel to ensure its survival is to keep a watchful eye on Iran, but not to do anything overly aggressive. Israel has every right to preserve its security, but air strikes are just likely to anger the entire region, and potentially drag the United States either directly into a conflict, or in some kind of offshore balancing (sort of like the Lend/Lease acts with the UK around WWII).
Thursday, June 4, 2009
The Nuclear Triad
The Nuclear Triad in the Post Cold War Era
Throughout the Cold War, the nuclear triad was considered by policymakers and military strategists as a key capability in preserving both the United States’ deterrent and second strike capability. The combination of nuclear armed submarines, land based ballistic missiles, and aerial strategic bombers enabled a steady deterrent to both the United States and the Soviet Union. Since the decline of the Soviet military establishment and the absence of a major threat, however, the traditional nuclear triad is no longer a relevant approach to deterrence for the United States. Countries such as the United Kingdom and France are able to maintain a deterrent with an incomplete triad; would the United States be able to do the same? With Russia and the United States willing to reduce their nuclear arsenals and an increase in global strike capabilities, will the United States be able to solely use one part of the triad? This paper examines each part of the traditional nuclear triad in the context of modern U.S. nuclear strategy and advancements in military technology. Then, an alternate way to think about the nuclear triad and deterrence in the 21st Century is proposed.
Nuclear armed submarines, or SSBNs, are perhaps the most capable leg of the traditional nuclear triad. As of 2008, there are 14 nuclear armed Ohio-class submarines in the U.S. fleet, and they carry close to 38% of operational strategic forces.[1] The submarines carry up to 24 tactical D5 (TRIDENT) missiles each with MIRV capabilities, providing for an enormous amount of firepower.[2] SSBNs possess numerous advantages over land based ballistic missiles or aerial strategic bombers. Of most importance is a submarines ability to operate close to undetected over an enormous area, namely the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. This sea roaming capability has two direct consequences. First, an SSBN is able to get in close proximity to its intended target, which in turn increases the lethality and accuracy of the SLBMs. Second, the broad range of operations makes it difficult for enemy navies to react and mobilize effective countermeasures.
That being said, there are still two major proposals which aim to neutralize the effectiveness of SSBNs, but in reality, reflect dated Cold War thinking about naval strategy. The first is the issue of communications between national command authority and the captain of the submarine. If submarines are unable to communicate with command and confirm their orders, then they are not of much use. In addition, they could theoretically become more dangerous if there were orders to treat a breakdown in communications as evidence of an attack. This logic is rooted in a Cold War era mindset. Over the past 15-20 years, there have been great advancements made in naval communications. Systems such as TACAMO aircraft and various satellite and shore based transmitters work concordantly to ensure communication linkages to SSBNs are not compromised. These developments are proven to be 99.99% reliable according to U.S. Naval estimates.[3] In addition, the development of the Extremely Low Frequency Communications Program allows SSBNs to operate at lower depths and at faster speeds while retaining the ability to receive low frequency messages.[4] Another school of thought is the advancements made in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in the last decade. China’s navy has added ships with increased ASW capabilities[5], but it will take some time for any opposing navy to successfully countermeasure the U.S. strategic submarine fleet.
The second leg of the traditional nuclear triad, the strategic bomber capability, is both highly accurate, and highly vulnerable. Currently, the United States deploys three separate LRSA (long range strike/action) aircraft: 65 B1-B Lancer, 19 B-2A Sprit, and 67 B-52H Stratofortress.[6] Strategic bombers are highly accurate, perhaps even more so than SLBMs, and they can deliver their payload to a precise location in enemy territory, primarily due to the advancements in stealth technology. Also critically important is that strategic bombers can be recalled at the last minute if hostilities cease. In the nuclear age, there is always the slight possibility of an accidental launch or misuse of a nuclear weapon.[7] When a ballistic missile is fired from either land or sea, it cannot be taken back. But as with nuclear submarines, there are risks associated with relying on strategic bombers. First, there is the chance that the bomber could be shot down. While USAF stealth technology is highly advanced, it is not infallible, as was the case when Serbian militias downed an F-117 stealth bomber in 1999 during the NATO bombing of Kosovo.[8] Another issue is strategic bombers take a long time to reach their target, while ballistic missiles can strike a target in a matter of minutes. Advancements in fuel technology have helped out somewhat, but bombers launched from the United States still must be refueled in flight, and they still take a long time to reach their objective. Offshore air bases pose their own sets of problems, as it can be difficult to secure access to them.
The third and final leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), consists of LGM-30 Minuteman III missiles. As of 2008, there are currently 488 deployed Minuteman IIIs, each armed with the W62, W78, or W87 warhead.[9] Under the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, the idea of single warhead nuclear weapons was put forward by the United States, but this idea has been reversed somewhat in recent years, with an eventual goal of 500 warheads on 450 missiles by the end of SORT in 2012. This would greatly reduce the use of MIRVs on ICBMs, decreasing both their lethality and reducing the risk for disaster. Even if plans to reduce the number of warheads on ICBMs occur, there are still advantages. U.S. ICBM silos are heavily fortified and are built to withstand heavy firepower. Also, ICBM silos are deployed at several places within the country, and a first strike on U.S. territory would be very unlikely to destroy them all. As of yet, directed energy and national missile defense is not at a point to severely limit a ICBMs capacity, but the technology is in place to make a difference in the future.
Now that each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad has been discussed, what is the way forward? The United States could easily maintain a successful and powerful deterrent by solely relying on SSBNs. From a strategic standpoint, the United States is blessed by the two large oceans which surround the continuous American territory and SSBNs are able to fully utilize this advantage to respond to a variety of threats. In addition, a reduced number of nuclear weapons scattered around in various locations is just as effective as having massive arsenals and an array of delivery systems.[10] SSBNs can combine the speed and lethality of ICBMs with the accuracy and survivability of strategic bombers. This versatility allows the United States to take a more restrained posture when it comes to our nuclear deterrent.
Going to an all SSBN force would also have other non-strategic implications. For one, the cost savings of maintaining a handful of submarines are much less than maintaining and modernizing ICBMs, silo maintenance, and upgrading strategic bombers. Second, an all SSBN force would decrease the likelihood of a nuclear disaster, going by the simple equation of less nuclear weapons equals a less chance of something going wrong. Finally, reducing the triad would give the United States significant diplomatic leverage in nuclear non-proliferation.
The model of the United Kingdom is one that the United States should look towards when thinking about the future of deterrence. Currently, the United Kingdom deterrent consists of four Vanguard class submarines with D-5 SLBMs. SIPRI estimates the UK to have around 185 active warheads.[11] In a geopolitical sense, the strategic position of the United States and United Kingdom is quite similar. Both countries have large maritime borders and a benign threat environment, which would allow for a reduction in strategic forces and delivery systems. In addition, it is necessary to look at who exactly needs to be deterred.
In the 21st Century, the United States is unlikely to face the types of threats confronting us in the 1960’s, 70’s, and 80’s. A reduced U.S. strategic posture relying on SSBNs would be able to deter rogue states such as Iran and North Korea as well as an emerging China and a regressing Russia. To reflect this shifting paradigm, the nuclear triad has to be reduced. A continuing reliance on all three legs no longer makes strategic sense in the post Cold War era. It is now feasible to do more with less.
Sources:
[1] Norris, Robert S. and Hans M. Kristensen. 2008. “U.S. nuclear forces, 2008.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 64 (1): 50-53.
[2] “SSBN-726 Ohio Class FBM Submarines.” Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/ssbn-726 Accessed June 2, 2009.
[3] Mies, Adm. Richard M. “The SSBN in National Security.” The United States Navy. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/usw/issue_5/ntlsecurity.html Accessed June 3, 2009.
[4] Aftergood, Steven. “Extremely Low Frequency Communications Program.” Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/c3i/elf.htm Accessed June 2, 2009.
[5] Economy, Elizabeth and Michel Oskenberg. 1999. China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects. New York: Council on Foreign Relations
[6] The International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2009. The Military Balance 2009. London: Routledge
[7] For a detailed discussion, see: Sagan, Scott. 1995. The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[8] Schmitt, Eric. 1999. “Downing a Stealth Jet: Shrewd Tactics or Lucky Shot?” The New York Times. 11 April 1999.
[9] Norris, Robert S. and Hans M. Kristensen. 2008. “U.S. nuclear forces, 2008.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 64 (1): 50-53.
[10] Waltz, Kenneth N. and Scott D. Sagan. 2002. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
[11] SIPRI. 2008. “United Kingdom’s Nuclear Forces.” http://first.sipri.org/search?country=GBR&dataset=nuclear-forces Accessed June 3, 2009.
Throughout the Cold War, the nuclear triad was considered by policymakers and military strategists as a key capability in preserving both the United States’ deterrent and second strike capability. The combination of nuclear armed submarines, land based ballistic missiles, and aerial strategic bombers enabled a steady deterrent to both the United States and the Soviet Union. Since the decline of the Soviet military establishment and the absence of a major threat, however, the traditional nuclear triad is no longer a relevant approach to deterrence for the United States. Countries such as the United Kingdom and France are able to maintain a deterrent with an incomplete triad; would the United States be able to do the same? With Russia and the United States willing to reduce their nuclear arsenals and an increase in global strike capabilities, will the United States be able to solely use one part of the triad? This paper examines each part of the traditional nuclear triad in the context of modern U.S. nuclear strategy and advancements in military technology. Then, an alternate way to think about the nuclear triad and deterrence in the 21st Century is proposed.
Nuclear armed submarines, or SSBNs, are perhaps the most capable leg of the traditional nuclear triad. As of 2008, there are 14 nuclear armed Ohio-class submarines in the U.S. fleet, and they carry close to 38% of operational strategic forces.[1] The submarines carry up to 24 tactical D5 (TRIDENT) missiles each with MIRV capabilities, providing for an enormous amount of firepower.[2] SSBNs possess numerous advantages over land based ballistic missiles or aerial strategic bombers. Of most importance is a submarines ability to operate close to undetected over an enormous area, namely the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. This sea roaming capability has two direct consequences. First, an SSBN is able to get in close proximity to its intended target, which in turn increases the lethality and accuracy of the SLBMs. Second, the broad range of operations makes it difficult for enemy navies to react and mobilize effective countermeasures.
That being said, there are still two major proposals which aim to neutralize the effectiveness of SSBNs, but in reality, reflect dated Cold War thinking about naval strategy. The first is the issue of communications between national command authority and the captain of the submarine. If submarines are unable to communicate with command and confirm their orders, then they are not of much use. In addition, they could theoretically become more dangerous if there were orders to treat a breakdown in communications as evidence of an attack. This logic is rooted in a Cold War era mindset. Over the past 15-20 years, there have been great advancements made in naval communications. Systems such as TACAMO aircraft and various satellite and shore based transmitters work concordantly to ensure communication linkages to SSBNs are not compromised. These developments are proven to be 99.99% reliable according to U.S. Naval estimates.[3] In addition, the development of the Extremely Low Frequency Communications Program allows SSBNs to operate at lower depths and at faster speeds while retaining the ability to receive low frequency messages.[4] Another school of thought is the advancements made in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in the last decade. China’s navy has added ships with increased ASW capabilities[5], but it will take some time for any opposing navy to successfully countermeasure the U.S. strategic submarine fleet.
The second leg of the traditional nuclear triad, the strategic bomber capability, is both highly accurate, and highly vulnerable. Currently, the United States deploys three separate LRSA (long range strike/action) aircraft: 65 B1-B Lancer, 19 B-2A Sprit, and 67 B-52H Stratofortress.[6] Strategic bombers are highly accurate, perhaps even more so than SLBMs, and they can deliver their payload to a precise location in enemy territory, primarily due to the advancements in stealth technology. Also critically important is that strategic bombers can be recalled at the last minute if hostilities cease. In the nuclear age, there is always the slight possibility of an accidental launch or misuse of a nuclear weapon.[7] When a ballistic missile is fired from either land or sea, it cannot be taken back. But as with nuclear submarines, there are risks associated with relying on strategic bombers. First, there is the chance that the bomber could be shot down. While USAF stealth technology is highly advanced, it is not infallible, as was the case when Serbian militias downed an F-117 stealth bomber in 1999 during the NATO bombing of Kosovo.[8] Another issue is strategic bombers take a long time to reach their target, while ballistic missiles can strike a target in a matter of minutes. Advancements in fuel technology have helped out somewhat, but bombers launched from the United States still must be refueled in flight, and they still take a long time to reach their objective. Offshore air bases pose their own sets of problems, as it can be difficult to secure access to them.
The third and final leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), consists of LGM-30 Minuteman III missiles. As of 2008, there are currently 488 deployed Minuteman IIIs, each armed with the W62, W78, or W87 warhead.[9] Under the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, the idea of single warhead nuclear weapons was put forward by the United States, but this idea has been reversed somewhat in recent years, with an eventual goal of 500 warheads on 450 missiles by the end of SORT in 2012. This would greatly reduce the use of MIRVs on ICBMs, decreasing both their lethality and reducing the risk for disaster. Even if plans to reduce the number of warheads on ICBMs occur, there are still advantages. U.S. ICBM silos are heavily fortified and are built to withstand heavy firepower. Also, ICBM silos are deployed at several places within the country, and a first strike on U.S. territory would be very unlikely to destroy them all. As of yet, directed energy and national missile defense is not at a point to severely limit a ICBMs capacity, but the technology is in place to make a difference in the future.
Now that each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad has been discussed, what is the way forward? The United States could easily maintain a successful and powerful deterrent by solely relying on SSBNs. From a strategic standpoint, the United States is blessed by the two large oceans which surround the continuous American territory and SSBNs are able to fully utilize this advantage to respond to a variety of threats. In addition, a reduced number of nuclear weapons scattered around in various locations is just as effective as having massive arsenals and an array of delivery systems.[10] SSBNs can combine the speed and lethality of ICBMs with the accuracy and survivability of strategic bombers. This versatility allows the United States to take a more restrained posture when it comes to our nuclear deterrent.
Going to an all SSBN force would also have other non-strategic implications. For one, the cost savings of maintaining a handful of submarines are much less than maintaining and modernizing ICBMs, silo maintenance, and upgrading strategic bombers. Second, an all SSBN force would decrease the likelihood of a nuclear disaster, going by the simple equation of less nuclear weapons equals a less chance of something going wrong. Finally, reducing the triad would give the United States significant diplomatic leverage in nuclear non-proliferation.
The model of the United Kingdom is one that the United States should look towards when thinking about the future of deterrence. Currently, the United Kingdom deterrent consists of four Vanguard class submarines with D-5 SLBMs. SIPRI estimates the UK to have around 185 active warheads.[11] In a geopolitical sense, the strategic position of the United States and United Kingdom is quite similar. Both countries have large maritime borders and a benign threat environment, which would allow for a reduction in strategic forces and delivery systems. In addition, it is necessary to look at who exactly needs to be deterred.
In the 21st Century, the United States is unlikely to face the types of threats confronting us in the 1960’s, 70’s, and 80’s. A reduced U.S. strategic posture relying on SSBNs would be able to deter rogue states such as Iran and North Korea as well as an emerging China and a regressing Russia. To reflect this shifting paradigm, the nuclear triad has to be reduced. A continuing reliance on all three legs no longer makes strategic sense in the post Cold War era. It is now feasible to do more with less.
Sources:
[1] Norris, Robert S. and Hans M. Kristensen. 2008. “U.S. nuclear forces, 2008.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 64 (1): 50-53.
[2] “SSBN-726 Ohio Class FBM Submarines.” Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/ssbn-726 Accessed June 2, 2009.
[3] Mies, Adm. Richard M. “The SSBN in National Security.” The United States Navy. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/usw/issue_5/ntlsecurity.html Accessed June 3, 2009.
[4] Aftergood, Steven. “Extremely Low Frequency Communications Program.” Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/c3i/elf.htm Accessed June 2, 2009.
[5] Economy, Elizabeth and Michel Oskenberg. 1999. China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects. New York: Council on Foreign Relations
[6] The International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2009. The Military Balance 2009. London: Routledge
[7] For a detailed discussion, see: Sagan, Scott. 1995. The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[8] Schmitt, Eric. 1999. “Downing a Stealth Jet: Shrewd Tactics or Lucky Shot?” The New York Times. 11 April 1999.
[9] Norris, Robert S. and Hans M. Kristensen. 2008. “U.S. nuclear forces, 2008.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 64 (1): 50-53.
[10] Waltz, Kenneth N. and Scott D. Sagan. 2002. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
[11] SIPRI. 2008. “United Kingdom’s Nuclear Forces.” http://first.sipri.org/search?country=GBR&dataset=nuclear-forces Accessed June 3, 2009.
Wednesday, June 3, 2009
Russia, the CSTO, and War Games
Probably in response to NATO exercises in Georgia, the Russian military, alongside many of its closest allies in the region (Kazakhstan, Belarus, etc.) will conduct extensive war games under the banner of the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization). The logic here seems fairly simple. Russia is trying to flex its collective muscle by creating an organization similar to NATO. And much like the United States does within NATO, Russia will dominate over the other members, who are probably just looking to Moscow for security.
Does a functional CSTO pose any sort of threat to Europe or NATO? The answer is no. As I've pointed out in a previous post, the Russian military has been slowly decaying since the end of the Cold War, and due to the harsh economic conditions in Russia, their defense spending will probably decline significantly over the next few years. And while I would be supportive of NATO ceasing to exist, I don't think that would encourage or bait the Russians to do anything stupid. They know what their capabilities are, are nobody looking at them really believes they have any real capabilities.
Russia's power projection does not extend past their previous sphere of influence during the days of the Soviet Union, so I don't really see the worry about them banding together with a few insignificant former Soviet republics and running war games. We all know Russia has tried to meddle in the affairs of the various republics, but it's usually a desperate attempt to reassert their dominance.
In addition, Russia wants to reset relations with the United States and make sure they can sell their oil to the rest of Europe. Starting another war severely damages those objectives.
Does a functional CSTO pose any sort of threat to Europe or NATO? The answer is no. As I've pointed out in a previous post, the Russian military has been slowly decaying since the end of the Cold War, and due to the harsh economic conditions in Russia, their defense spending will probably decline significantly over the next few years. And while I would be supportive of NATO ceasing to exist, I don't think that would encourage or bait the Russians to do anything stupid. They know what their capabilities are, are nobody looking at them really believes they have any real capabilities.
Russia's power projection does not extend past their previous sphere of influence during the days of the Soviet Union, so I don't really see the worry about them banding together with a few insignificant former Soviet republics and running war games. We all know Russia has tried to meddle in the affairs of the various republics, but it's usually a desperate attempt to reassert their dominance.
In addition, Russia wants to reset relations with the United States and make sure they can sell their oil to the rest of Europe. Starting another war severely damages those objectives.
The United States & Cuba
I've tended to write more about security/military issues, but I felt this was important enough to merit its own post.
At a meeting between the Organization of American States, Sec. of State Hillary Clinton has been urged to readmit Cuba to the OAS after a 47 year absence. Also, the US and Cuba are set to resume talks over immigration between the two nations. These developments are important first steps, but there is still a long way to go, and I don't think anybody's forgotten that. The embargo has been a flat out disaster for the United States, and it has had terrible consequences on the people of Cuba.
We have to ask ourselves a very simple question, why is the embargo still there? What purpose does it serve? I think it primarily exists due to the influence of the Cuban lobby in Florida, but there are signs that is on the wane, as most of them are becoming older. In addition, President Obama, who won Florida in the 2008 election, was able to do so taking a more moderate approach on Cuba, something that would have been unthinkable in previous elections.
The embargo also speaks to the utter hypocrisy of US foreign policy. Are we really still that mad about the Cuban Missile Crisis? Do Fidel and Raul Castro really still bother us after all these years? It's ironic that the US is perfectly okay being friendly with brutal rulers like King Abdullah in Saudi Arabia, Hosni Mubarek in Egypt, or any of the Central Asian tyrants like Nazerbayev from Kazakhstan or Karimov from Uzbekistan, but the regime in Cuba is entireably intolerable.
On a deeper level, the sanctions do not actually work. Barring trade from Cuba does nothing to bring regime change to the island, as democratic reform in Cuba has not gained much ground in the preceding four decades when the embargo has been in place. Their is almost no internal democratic reform movement in Cuba, why? Most of the ones that really hate Castro have left to move to the United States, because of the harsh economic conditions in Cuba....that the United States created.
If the US wants to continue to pretend like it's a bastion of free markets and capitalism, lifting this repressive and counterproductive embargo on Cuba is a good first step.
At a meeting between the Organization of American States, Sec. of State Hillary Clinton has been urged to readmit Cuba to the OAS after a 47 year absence. Also, the US and Cuba are set to resume talks over immigration between the two nations. These developments are important first steps, but there is still a long way to go, and I don't think anybody's forgotten that. The embargo has been a flat out disaster for the United States, and it has had terrible consequences on the people of Cuba.
We have to ask ourselves a very simple question, why is the embargo still there? What purpose does it serve? I think it primarily exists due to the influence of the Cuban lobby in Florida, but there are signs that is on the wane, as most of them are becoming older. In addition, President Obama, who won Florida in the 2008 election, was able to do so taking a more moderate approach on Cuba, something that would have been unthinkable in previous elections.
The embargo also speaks to the utter hypocrisy of US foreign policy. Are we really still that mad about the Cuban Missile Crisis? Do Fidel and Raul Castro really still bother us after all these years? It's ironic that the US is perfectly okay being friendly with brutal rulers like King Abdullah in Saudi Arabia, Hosni Mubarek in Egypt, or any of the Central Asian tyrants like Nazerbayev from Kazakhstan or Karimov from Uzbekistan, but the regime in Cuba is entireably intolerable.
On a deeper level, the sanctions do not actually work. Barring trade from Cuba does nothing to bring regime change to the island, as democratic reform in Cuba has not gained much ground in the preceding four decades when the embargo has been in place. Their is almost no internal democratic reform movement in Cuba, why? Most of the ones that really hate Castro have left to move to the United States, because of the harsh economic conditions in Cuba....that the United States created.
If the US wants to continue to pretend like it's a bastion of free markets and capitalism, lifting this repressive and counterproductive embargo on Cuba is a good first step.
Tuesday, June 2, 2009
Mitt Romney is Crazy
Just in case you forgot, Mitt Romney is crazy.
Here are a few of my favorite tidbits from Romney's speech to the Heritage Foundation.
- A $50 billion a year increase in defense modernization. Erm....what? We already approximate what the rest of the world spends on defense, and most of our nearest "competitors" are our allies such as the UK, Germany, and France. If you add up all the "bad guys" (Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and let's throw in Syria, Cuba, Venezuela, and Libya for fun) it doesn't even come close to approaching the US defense budget. Our forces are already incredibly advanced and are capable of dealing with a wide range of threats. We spend over $650 billion a year on defense, and that number creeps over $800 billion if you add in war supplements, DHS, Veterans Affairs, and some other funds. The only way you can justify more defense spending is if you openly admit that you are a fanatical supporter of the military industrial complex.
-Regime crippling sanctions against North Korea. North Korea is perhaps the world's most isolated economy. They are not a part of the global economy. So what are sanctions going to achieve? Oh wait, sanctions worked so well in Cuba, forcing the Castro regime to democratize in a timely fashion...
-Full funding for missile defense. I've already spent a few posts talking about the fallacy of a national missile defense system, and how it would likely not stop countries like Iran and North Korea from proliferating. Again, the only justification Romney seems to give is old fashion fear mongering.
Here are a few of my favorite tidbits from Romney's speech to the Heritage Foundation.
- A $50 billion a year increase in defense modernization. Erm....what? We already approximate what the rest of the world spends on defense, and most of our nearest "competitors" are our allies such as the UK, Germany, and France. If you add up all the "bad guys" (Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and let's throw in Syria, Cuba, Venezuela, and Libya for fun) it doesn't even come close to approaching the US defense budget. Our forces are already incredibly advanced and are capable of dealing with a wide range of threats. We spend over $650 billion a year on defense, and that number creeps over $800 billion if you add in war supplements, DHS, Veterans Affairs, and some other funds. The only way you can justify more defense spending is if you openly admit that you are a fanatical supporter of the military industrial complex.
-Regime crippling sanctions against North Korea. North Korea is perhaps the world's most isolated economy. They are not a part of the global economy. So what are sanctions going to achieve? Oh wait, sanctions worked so well in Cuba, forcing the Castro regime to democratize in a timely fashion...
-Full funding for missile defense. I've already spent a few posts talking about the fallacy of a national missile defense system, and how it would likely not stop countries like Iran and North Korea from proliferating. Again, the only justification Romney seems to give is old fashion fear mongering.
Monday, June 1, 2009
Missile Defense vs. Rogue States
One of the more interesting aspects about missile defense for me has been whether or not it works against rogue states. In the wake of North Korea's nuclear test and their supposed upcoming long range missile test, recently desposed head weapons tester at DoD Charles McQueary said that the US would have a "reasonable chance" at intercepting a long range missile. While he can be confident of such a result, I think the testing would say otherwise. To date, there have only been 13 tests of the system since 1999, with 8 confirmed interceptions. There are two issues at stake, can we trust a system that's only been tested 13 times, and is a 62% success rate good enough?
There have been some good, quantitative studies done on the effectiveness of national missile defense (see here), and the results tend to say that missile defense enhances the stability of deterrence, but that the current limited system is ineffective against the large arsenals of Russia and China.
But what about rogue states? So far, Japanese theater missile defense has not dissuaded DPRK from attempting to build up its nuclear arsenal. Similarly, the missile defense shield in Poland and the Czech Republic has not halted Iran's hopes of acquiring nuclear weapons. In these two cases, existing missile defense systems, which by all accounts would be able to sufficiently deal with the threat, have not dissuaded potential challengers.
This leaves a couple of conclusions. First, the desire for Iran and DPRK to proliferate is primarily based on defensive security factors. If either country was wanting to launch offensive strategic forces against selected targets, then they would be dissuaded by existing missile defense systems (the theater based systems in Japan/Eastern Europe are more effective than the national model discussed above). And while defensive security factors play a role, domestic politics do play a part here I think. Iran wants nuclear weapons as part of a grand strategy of becoming the leader of the Muslim world, and being the first Muslim country to acquire nuclear weapons surely boosts their credentials. In North Korea's case, the reappearance of their nuclear weapons program could be an attempt to leave Kim Jong-il's successor with a bargaining chip with the West.
Second, I don't think missile defense alters the equation with Russia or China. We can be reasonably assurred that deterrence works with both countries, and the presence of NMD or TMD doesn't change that. China has maintained a relatively restrained arsenal, while Russia's has been primarily focused on maintaining equivalence with the United States. In neither case does NMD or TMD play a determining factor in reducing or increasing strategic forces.
There have been some good, quantitative studies done on the effectiveness of national missile defense (see here), and the results tend to say that missile defense enhances the stability of deterrence, but that the current limited system is ineffective against the large arsenals of Russia and China.
But what about rogue states? So far, Japanese theater missile defense has not dissuaded DPRK from attempting to build up its nuclear arsenal. Similarly, the missile defense shield in Poland and the Czech Republic has not halted Iran's hopes of acquiring nuclear weapons. In these two cases, existing missile defense systems, which by all accounts would be able to sufficiently deal with the threat, have not dissuaded potential challengers.
This leaves a couple of conclusions. First, the desire for Iran and DPRK to proliferate is primarily based on defensive security factors. If either country was wanting to launch offensive strategic forces against selected targets, then they would be dissuaded by existing missile defense systems (the theater based systems in Japan/Eastern Europe are more effective than the national model discussed above). And while defensive security factors play a role, domestic politics do play a part here I think. Iran wants nuclear weapons as part of a grand strategy of becoming the leader of the Muslim world, and being the first Muslim country to acquire nuclear weapons surely boosts their credentials. In North Korea's case, the reappearance of their nuclear weapons program could be an attempt to leave Kim Jong-il's successor with a bargaining chip with the West.
Second, I don't think missile defense alters the equation with Russia or China. We can be reasonably assurred that deterrence works with both countries, and the presence of NMD or TMD doesn't change that. China has maintained a relatively restrained arsenal, while Russia's has been primarily focused on maintaining equivalence with the United States. In neither case does NMD or TMD play a determining factor in reducing or increasing strategic forces.
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