Missile Defense vs. Rogue States

One of the more interesting aspects about missile defense for me has been whether or not it works against rogue states. In the wake of North Korea's nuclear test and their supposed upcoming long range missile test, recently desposed head weapons tester at DoD Charles McQueary said that the US would have a "reasonable chance" at intercepting a long range missile. While he can be confident of such a result, I think the testing would say otherwise. To date, there have only been 13 tests of the system since 1999, with 8 confirmed interceptions. There are two issues at stake, can we trust a system that's only been tested 13 times, and is a 62% success rate good enough?

There have been some good, quantitative studies done on the effectiveness of national missile defense (see here), and the results tend to say that missile defense enhances the stability of deterrence, but that the current limited system is ineffective against the large arsenals of Russia and China.

But what about rogue states? So far, Japanese theater missile defense has not dissuaded DPRK from attempting to build up its nuclear arsenal. Similarly, the missile defense shield in Poland and the Czech Republic has not halted Iran's hopes of acquiring nuclear weapons. In these two cases, existing missile defense systems, which by all accounts would be able to sufficiently deal with the threat, have not dissuaded potential challengers.

This leaves a couple of conclusions. First, the desire for Iran and DPRK to proliferate is primarily based on defensive security factors. If either country was wanting to launch offensive strategic forces against selected targets, then they would be dissuaded by existing missile defense systems (the theater based systems in Japan/Eastern Europe are more effective than the national model discussed above). And while defensive security factors play a role, domestic politics do play a part here I think. Iran wants nuclear weapons as part of a grand strategy of becoming the leader of the Muslim world, and being the first Muslim country to acquire nuclear weapons surely boosts their credentials. In North Korea's case, the reappearance of their nuclear weapons program could be an attempt to leave Kim Jong-il's successor with a bargaining chip with the West.

Second, I don't think missile defense alters the equation with Russia or China. We can be reasonably assurred that deterrence works with both countries, and the presence of NMD or TMD doesn't change that. China has maintained a relatively restrained arsenal, while Russia's has been primarily focused on maintaining equivalence with the United States. In neither case does NMD or TMD play a determining factor in reducing or increasing strategic forces.