The Nuclear Triad

The Nuclear Triad in the Post Cold War Era


Throughout the Cold War, the nuclear triad was considered by policymakers and military strategists as a key capability in preserving both the United States’ deterrent and second strike capability. The combination of nuclear armed submarines, land based ballistic missiles, and aerial strategic bombers enabled a steady deterrent to both the United States and the Soviet Union. Since the decline of the Soviet military establishment and the absence of a major threat, however, the traditional nuclear triad is no longer a relevant approach to deterrence for the United States. Countries such as the United Kingdom and France are able to maintain a deterrent with an incomplete triad; would the United States be able to do the same? With Russia and the United States willing to reduce their nuclear arsenals and an increase in global strike capabilities, will the United States be able to solely use one part of the triad? This paper examines each part of the traditional nuclear triad in the context of modern U.S. nuclear strategy and advancements in military technology. Then, an alternate way to think about the nuclear triad and deterrence in the 21st Century is proposed.


Nuclear armed submarines, or SSBNs, are perhaps the most capable leg of the traditional nuclear triad. As of 2008, there are 14 nuclear armed Ohio-class submarines in the U.S. fleet, and they carry close to 38% of operational strategic forces.[1] The submarines carry up to 24 tactical D5 (TRIDENT) missiles each with MIRV capabilities, providing for an enormous amount of firepower.[2] SSBNs possess numerous advantages over land based ballistic missiles or aerial strategic bombers. Of most importance is a submarines ability to operate close to undetected over an enormous area, namely the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. This sea roaming capability has two direct consequences. First, an SSBN is able to get in close proximity to its intended target, which in turn increases the lethality and accuracy of the SLBMs. Second, the broad range of operations makes it difficult for enemy navies to react and mobilize effective countermeasures.

That being said, there are still two major proposals which aim to neutralize the effectiveness of SSBNs, but in reality, reflect dated Cold War thinking about naval strategy. The first is the issue of communications between national command authority and the captain of the submarine. If submarines are unable to communicate with command and confirm their orders, then they are not of much use. In addition, they could theoretically become more dangerous if there were orders to treat a breakdown in communications as evidence of an attack. This logic is rooted in a Cold War era mindset. Over the past 15-20 years, there have been great advancements made in naval communications. Systems such as TACAMO aircraft and various satellite and shore based transmitters work concordantly to ensure communication linkages to SSBNs are not compromised. These developments are proven to be 99.99% reliable according to U.S. Naval estimates.[3] In addition, the development of the Extremely Low Frequency Communications Program allows SSBNs to operate at lower depths and at faster speeds while retaining the ability to receive low frequency messages.[4] Another school of thought is the advancements made in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) in the last decade. China’s navy has added ships with increased ASW capabilities[5], but it will take some time for any opposing navy to successfully countermeasure the U.S. strategic submarine fleet.


The second leg of the traditional nuclear triad, the strategic bomber capability, is both highly accurate, and highly vulnerable. Currently, the United States deploys three separate LRSA (long range strike/action) aircraft: 65 B1-B Lancer, 19 B-2A Sprit, and 67 B-52H Stratofortress.[6] Strategic bombers are highly accurate, perhaps even more so than SLBMs, and they can deliver their payload to a precise location in enemy territory, primarily due to the advancements in stealth technology. Also critically important is that strategic bombers can be recalled at the last minute if hostilities cease. In the nuclear age, there is always the slight possibility of an accidental launch or misuse of a nuclear weapon.[7] When a ballistic missile is fired from either land or sea, it cannot be taken back. But as with nuclear submarines, there are risks associated with relying on strategic bombers. First, there is the chance that the bomber could be shot down. While USAF stealth technology is highly advanced, it is not infallible, as was the case when Serbian militias downed an F-117 stealth bomber in 1999 during the NATO bombing of Kosovo.[8] Another issue is strategic bombers take a long time to reach their target, while ballistic missiles can strike a target in a matter of minutes. Advancements in fuel technology have helped out somewhat, but bombers launched from the United States still must be refueled in flight, and they still take a long time to reach their objective. Offshore air bases pose their own sets of problems, as it can be difficult to secure access to them.


The third and final leg of the U.S. nuclear triad, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), consists of LGM-30 Minuteman III missiles. As of 2008, there are currently 488 deployed Minuteman IIIs, each armed with the W62, W78, or W87 warhead.[9] Under the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, the idea of single warhead nuclear weapons was put forward by the United States, but this idea has been reversed somewhat in recent years, with an eventual goal of 500 warheads on 450 missiles by the end of SORT in 2012. This would greatly reduce the use of MIRVs on ICBMs, decreasing both their lethality and reducing the risk for disaster. Even if plans to reduce the number of warheads on ICBMs occur, there are still advantages. U.S. ICBM silos are heavily fortified and are built to withstand heavy firepower. Also, ICBM silos are deployed at several places within the country, and a first strike on U.S. territory would be very unlikely to destroy them all. As of yet, directed energy and national missile defense is not at a point to severely limit a ICBMs capacity, but the technology is in place to make a difference in the future.

Now that each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad has been discussed, what is the way forward? The United States could easily maintain a successful and powerful deterrent by solely relying on SSBNs. From a strategic standpoint, the United States is blessed by the two large oceans which surround the continuous American territory and SSBNs are able to fully utilize this advantage to respond to a variety of threats. In addition, a reduced number of nuclear weapons scattered around in various locations is just as effective as having massive arsenals and an array of delivery systems.[10] SSBNs can combine the speed and lethality of ICBMs with the accuracy and survivability of strategic bombers. This versatility allows the United States to take a more restrained posture when it comes to our nuclear deterrent.


Going to an all SSBN force would also have other non-strategic implications. For one, the cost savings of maintaining a handful of submarines are much less than maintaining and modernizing ICBMs, silo maintenance, and upgrading strategic bombers. Second, an all SSBN force would decrease the likelihood of a nuclear disaster, going by the simple equation of less nuclear weapons equals a less chance of something going wrong. Finally, reducing the triad would give the United States significant diplomatic leverage in nuclear non-proliferation.

The model of the United Kingdom is one that the United States should look towards when thinking about the future of deterrence. Currently, the United Kingdom deterrent consists of four Vanguard class submarines with D-5 SLBMs. SIPRI estimates the UK to have around 185 active warheads.[11] In a geopolitical sense, the strategic position of the United States and United Kingdom is quite similar. Both countries have large maritime borders and a benign threat environment, which would allow for a reduction in strategic forces and delivery systems. In addition, it is necessary to look at who exactly needs to be deterred.

In the 21st Century, the United States is unlikely to face the types of threats confronting us in the 1960’s, 70’s, and 80’s. A reduced U.S. strategic posture relying on SSBNs would be able to deter rogue states such as Iran and North Korea as well as an emerging China and a regressing Russia. To reflect this shifting paradigm, the nuclear triad has to be reduced. A continuing reliance on all three legs no longer makes strategic sense in the post Cold War era. It is now feasible to do more with less.


Sources:



[1] Norris, Robert S. and Hans M. Kristensen. 2008. “U.S. nuclear forces, 2008.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 64 (1): 50-53.
[2] “SSBN-726 Ohio Class FBM Submarines.” Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/ssbn-726 Accessed June 2, 2009.
[3] Mies, Adm. Richard M. “The SSBN in National Security.” The United States Navy. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/usw/issue_5/ntlsecurity.html Accessed June 3, 2009.
[4] Aftergood, Steven. “Extremely Low Frequency Communications Program.” Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/c3i/elf.htm Accessed June 2, 2009.
[5] Economy, Elizabeth and Michel Oskenberg. 1999. China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects. New York: Council on Foreign Relations
[6] The International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2009. The Military Balance 2009. London: Routledge
[7] For a detailed discussion, see: Sagan, Scott. 1995. The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[8] Schmitt, Eric. 1999. “Downing a Stealth Jet: Shrewd Tactics or Lucky Shot?” The New York Times. 11 April 1999.
[9] Norris, Robert S. and Hans M. Kristensen. 2008. “U.S. nuclear forces, 2008.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 64 (1): 50-53.
[10] Waltz, Kenneth N. and Scott D. Sagan. 2002. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
[11] SIPRI. 2008. “United Kingdom’s Nuclear Forces.” http://first.sipri.org/search?country=GBR&dataset=nuclear-forces Accessed June 3, 2009.